Шмона Праким — Махшава

Шмона Праким

Шмона Праким — Махшава на Бет ха-Мидраш: еврейский текст и перевод на русский, с Раши и великими комментаторами. Бесплатно, онлайн.

הפרק הראשון - בנפש האדם וכוחותיה דע, כי נפש האדם נפש אחת, ולה פעולות רבות חלוקות, ייקראו קצת הפעולות ההן 'נפשות'. ויחשב בעבור זה, שיש לאדם נפשות רבות, כמו שחושבים הרופאים, עד שפתח ראש הרופאים ואמר, שהנפשות שלוש: טבעית, וחיונית, ונפשית. ופעמים ייקראו 'כוחות' ו'חלקים', עד שיאמר: 'חלקי הנפש', וזה השם ישתמשו בו הפילוסופים הרבה. ואינם מתכוונים באומרם 'חלקי', שהיא מתחלקת כהיחלק הגופות, ואמנם הם מונים פעולותיה החלוקות, אשר הן לכלל הנפש - כחלקים לכל המחובר מהחלקים ההם.CHAPTER I CONCERNING THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES, c. I; Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XLVI, pp. 9—10; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 45 ff. A summary of the Peraḳim is found in Speier, The Threefold Cord (London, 1891), Appendix. Know that the human soul is one,, I, 41, M. explains the term soul (נפש) as being "the vitality which is common to all sentient beings." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, c. 1 (ed. Hicks, pp. 50 and 51), "Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life." On the homonymous use of the word נפש, see Moreh, loc. cit. but that it has many diversified activities. Some of these activities have, indeed, been called souls, which has given rise to the opinion that man has many souls, as was the belief of the physicians, with the result that the most distinguished of them, p. 45; Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 1, n. 2; M. Schloessinger, in JE., VI, p. 403. states in the introduction of his book that there are three souls, the physical, the vital, and the psychical., pp. 38—39), he divides the faculties into five classes. In Moreh, III, 12, he points to the threefold division of the faculties, where he says, "all physical, psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one individual are found also in the other individuals." See, also, ibid., III, 46 (end), where the appetitive (התאוה), the vital (החיונית), and the psychic (הנפשײת) faculties are enumerated. Baḥya, Ibn Gabirol, and Ibn Zaddik seem to have believed in the existence of three souls in man. See I. Broydé in JE., vol. xi, art. Soul. Abraham ibn Daud, in Emunah Ramah, I, 6 (ed. Weil, 1842), also, opposed the belief of the physicians, supporting the Aristotelian view of the unity of the soul, as did M. Consult Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 11, n. 3; Munk, Guide, I, p. 355, n. 1; idem, Mélanges, p. 38, n. 1; p. 40, n. 3; p. 54, n. 2; Rosin, Ethik, p. 45, n. 1; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 398, n. 60. These activities are called faculties and parts, so that the phrase "parts of the soul," frequently employed by philosophers, is commonly used. By the word "parts", however, they do not intend to imply that the soul is divided into parts as are bodies, but they merely enumerate the different activities of the soul as being parts of a whole, the union of which makes up the soul.

ואתה יודע, שתקון המידות אמנם הוא ריפוי הנפש וכוחותיה. וכמו שהרופא אשר ירפא הגופות, צריך שידע תחילה הגוף אשר ירפאהו בכללו, וחלקי הגוף מה הם, רצוני לומר: גוף האדם, וצריך שידע אלו דברים יחלוהו, וירוחק מהם, ואלו דברים יבריאוהו, ויכוון אליהם - כן אשר ירפא הנפש וירצה לתקן המדות, צריך שידע נפש האדם בכללה ובחלקיה, ומה יחלה אותה, ומה יבריאה.Thou knowest that the improvement of the moral qualities is brought about by the healing of the soul and its activities. (תקון המדות, Ar. אצלאח אלאכלאק), is one which M. probably borrowed from Ibn Gabirol, author of Tiḳḳun Middot ha-Nefesh (The Improvement of the Moral Qualities) to designate the practical task of ethics. Cf. Rosin, Ethik, pp. 12, 37, n. 5. M. is not concerned with a theoretical discussion of ethics, but with the problem as to how one's moral qualities are to be improved, which is a practical question. Therefore, the science of curing the soul is to him as practical as is that of healing the body. What Aristotle says in Eth. Nic., II, 2 may well apply here. "Since, then, the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become virtuous, else it would be useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them, because, as we have just said, the character of the habits that shall be formed depends on these." Therefore, just as the physician, who endeavors to cure the human body, must have a perfect knowledge of it in its entirety and its individual parts, just as he must know what causes sickness that it may be avoided, and must also be acquainted with the means by which a patient may be cured, so, likewise, he who tries to cure the soul, wishing to improve the moral qualities, must have a knowledge of the soul in its totality and its parts, must know how to prevent it from becoming diseased, and how to maintain its health., I, 2). Cf. Eth. Nic., I, 12, where Aristotle states that it is necessary for the Politician (moralist) to have a certain knowledge of the nature of the soul, just as it is for the oculist to have a knowledge of the whole body, and in fact more so, as Politics (ethics) is more important than the healing art.

ומפני זה אומר, שחלקי הנפש חמשה: הזן, והמרגיש, והמדמה, והמתעורר, והשכלי. וכבר הקדמנו בזה הפרק, שדברינו אינם אלא בנפש האדם. כי כח המזון, על דרך משל, אשר לאדם, איננו כח המזון אשר לחמור ולסוס. כי האדם ניזון בחלק הזן מן הנפש האנושית, והחמור ניזון בחלק הזן מן הנפש החמורית, והדקל ניזון בחלק הזן מן הנפש אשר לו. ואמנם ייאמר על כל אלו האישים 'ניזון' - בשתוף השם בלבד, לא שהענין אחד בעינו. וכן ייאמר על איש האדם ובעל החיים 'מרגיש' - בשיתוף השם בלבד, לא שההרגשה אשר בראובן היא ההרגשה אשר בזה הסוס, ולא ההרגשה אשר בזה המין היא ההרגשה בעינה אשר בזה המין האחר. אלא כל מין ומין מאשר לו נפש - יש לו נפש אחת זולת נפש האחר, ויתחייבו מנפש זה פעולות, ומנפש זה פעולות, ואפשר שתדמה פעולה לפעולה, וייחשב בשתי הפעולות שהן דבר אחד בעינו, ואין הדבר כן. ומשלו משל שלושה מקומות חשוכים, אחד מהם זרחה עליו השמש והאיר, והשני עלה עליו הירח והאיר, והאחר הודלק בו נר והאיר. הנה כל אחד מהם כבר נמצא בו האור, אבל סיבת זה האור ופועלו - השמש, ופועל האחר - הירח, ופועל האחר - האש. כן פועל הרגשת האדם הוא נפש האדם, ופועל הרגשת החמור - נפש החמור, ופועל הרגשת הנשר - נפש הנשר, ואין להם ענין יקבצם, אלא שיתוף השם בלבד. והשג זה הענין, שהוא נפלא מאד, יכשלו בו הרבה מן המתפלספים, ויחייבו מזה דברים מגונים ודעות בלתי נכונות.So, I say that the soul has five faculties; the nutritive [also known as the "growing" faculty], the sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive, and the rational., has that of imagination. δυνάμεις δ' εἰπομεν ϑρεπτικὸν (הזן), ὀρεκτικόν (המתעורר), αἰσϑητικόν (המרגיש), κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν (השכלי). De Anima, II, 3, ed. Hicks, pp. 58 and 59. M.’s division is preferable to that of Aristotle, motion being subservient to the appetitive and the rational faculties, as Aristotle himself states (De Motu Animalium, chaps. 6 and 8). M. considers motion, especially that of the limbs of the body, to be dependent upon the appetitive faculty (see infra, p. 43), and to be “an accident pertaining to living things” (Moreh, I, 26). Cf., also, ibid. I, 46 (שהתנוע אינה מעצם החי אבל מקרה דבק בו); and Aristotle, Physics, V, 2. See Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 11, n. 3; p. 14, n. 4. Al-Farabi (התחלות הנמצאות, in ספר האסיף, Leipzig, 1849, p. 2) divides the faculties as follows: הכח המדברת (השכלי of M.) והכח המתעורר והכח המדמה והכח המרגיש. In making his division, M. seems to have had in mind the divisions of Aristotle and al-Farabi. By adding the nutritive faculty (הזן), which Aristotle includes in his list, to the list of al-Farabi we have M.’s list. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 47, n. 4. We have already stated in this chapter that our words concern themselves only with the human soul; for the nutritive faculty by which man is nourished is not the same, for instance, as that of the ass or the horse. Man is sustained by the nutritive faculty of the human soul, the ass thrives by means of the nutritive faculty of its soul, and the palm-tree flourishes by the nutritive faculty peculiar to its soul. Although we apply the same term nutrition to all of them indiscriminately, nevertheless, its signification is by no means the same. In the same way, the term sensation is used homonymously, i. e. the participation of two things in the same name. In Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XII, M. defines this term as follows. “If a noun has a number of significations it is a homonym ....... The word עין, which is used to designate the eye which sees, and a fountain, is a homonym. The common or appelative noun (see Munk, Guide, I, Introd., p. 6, n. 2) designates something common to two or more things, and by such a word we recognize, as regards each of these things, the class to which it belongs on account of the conception of the thing which each shares in common, as, for instance, the word living (חי) which is applied to a man, a horse, a scorpion, and a fish; for life, which consists of nutrition and sensation, is a common possession of each one of these species.” In this sense, the words nutrition (נזון) and sensation (מרגיש) are homonyms. See Munk, Guide, I, Introd., p. 6, notes 2 and 3; and Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, pp. 420, n. 91, 460, n. 148, 461, n. 149. for man and beast; not with the idea, however, that the sensation of one species is the same as that of another, for each species has its own characteristic soul distinct from every other, with the result that there necessarily arises from each soul activities peculiar to itself. It is possible, however, that an activity of one soul may seem to be similar to that of another, in consequence of which one might think that both belong to the same class, and thus consider them to be alike; but such is not the case. By way of elucidation, let us imagine that three dark places are illumined, one lit up by the sun shining upon it, the second by the moon, and the third by a flame. Now, in each of these places there is light, but the efficient cause in the one case is the sun, in the other the moon, and in the third the fire. So it is with sensation and its causes. In man it is the human soul, in the ass it is the soul of the ass, and in the eagle, the soul of the eagle. These sensations have, moreover, nothing in common, except the homonymous term which is applied to them. Mark well this point, for it is very important, as many so-called philosophers have fallen into error regarding it, in consequence of which they have been driven to absurdities and fallacies.

ואשוב אל כוונתנו בחלקי הנפש, ואומר: החלק הזן - ממנו הכח המושך, והמחזיק, והמעכל, והדוחה המותרות, והמגדל, והמוליד הדומה, והמבדיל הליחות עד שיפריש מה שראוי להיזון בו ומה שראוי לדחותו. והדברים על אלו השבעה כוחות, ובמה יפעלו, ואיך יפעלו, ובאילו איברים פעולתם יותר נראית ויותר גלויה, ומה מהם נמצא תמיד, ומה יכלה מהם בזמן קצוב - זה כולו קשור למלאכת הרפואה, ואין צורך בו במקום הזה.Returning to our subject of the faculties of the soul, let me say that the nutritive faculty consists of (1) the power of attracting nourishment to the body, (2) the retention of the same, (3) its digestion (assimilation), (4) the repulsion of superfluities, (5) growth, (6) procreation, and (7) the differentiation of the nutritive juices that are necessary for sustenance from those which are to be expelled., I, 72. See Munk, Guide, I, p. 367, n. 5. The detailed discussion of these seven faculties—the means by which and how they perform their functions, in which members of the body their operations are most visible and perceptible, which of them are always present, and which disappear within a given time—belongs to the science of medicine, and need not be taken up here.

והחלק המרגיש - ממנו הכוחות החמשה, המפורסמים אצל ההמון: הראיה, והשמיעה, והטעם, והריח, והמישוש, והוא נמצא בכל שטח הגוף, ואין לו איבר מיוחד כמו שיש לארבעת הכוחות.The faculty of sensation consists of the five well-known senses of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling, the last of which is found over the whole surface of the body, not being confined to any special member, as are the other four faculties.

Eight Chapters 1